Hebrew patriarchal society, like that of the Babylonian cities,1 the Hittites, and many other primitive peoples,2 was based upon the idea of collective responsibility. Mosaic law, even though it established individual liability of every member of the nation, still preserved various remnants of the ancient system. In contradistinction to the practice ascribed to Lemech (Genesis 4:24), the Hebrew redeemer of blood was permitted to kill only the murderer himself and not his kinsmen. Nevertheless, the elders of a village near which a man had been murdered were morally responsible for the crime (Deuteronomy 21:1–9).3 The individual who committed a grave offense was "cut off from the people"; the nation was asked "to purge the evil from its midst" and the blessing or curses of the covenant were addressed to every individual Israelite.4 If the community failed to call the culprit to account, however, it was held collectively responsible to the divine overlord. An example of this process is the story of Achan (Joshua 7; 22:20).
While in Babylonian and perhaps also in Hittite law, the principle of talion was applied not only to the criminal himself but also to his dependents,5 Hebrew courts did not inflict punishment on ascendants or descendants (Deuteronomy 24:16; 2 Kings 14:6; Jeremiah 31:28–29; Ezekiel 18). Divine justice, however, was still described according to the earlier formula as "visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children even unto the third and fourth generation" (Exodus 20:5; Leviticus 26:39; Deuteronomy 5:9; Lamentations 5:7).6
Other ideas in Hebrew religion also originated from the concept of the vicarious liability of the paterfamilias. A man was responsible for his wife's vow (Numbers 30:16), for the prostitution of his daughter (Leviticus 21:9), and was called to atone for the crimes of his children (Job 1:5). The same role was also ascribed to the high priest and the "suffering servant," both of whom served as substitutes for the sinful people (Numbers 35:25–34; Isaiah 50:4–11; 53). Even God himself could be said to be profaned by certain acts of his people, such as false swearing (Leviticus 19:12) or ritual offenses (Leviticus 18:21; 21:6, 12).7
Biblical language distinguishes between several terms denoting crime: ḥe and peshaʿ were used for crimes against both man and God, the latter being mainly conceived as insurrections against the overlord. ʿawon signified "crooked" as opposed to upright behavior, while ʾasham was in the first instance a religious transgression. Each of these terms described not only the act itself but also the state created thereby and the punishment incurred or the fine payable. Biblical thought did not conceive of crime as a singular phenomenon, but rather as a blemish upon the criminal's character that could be wiped out only by the appropriate sanction.8
Animals were considered capable of suffering punishment for their criminal acts. As in Hittite law,9 Leviticus 20:15–16 prescribed the death penalty for a beast that had had unnatural relations with a man or a woman. The same sanction applied where a human being had been killed by an animal (Genesis 9:5; Exodus 21:28–32).10 This rule had its counterpart in Athenian law and later in medieval procedure.11 The rebellious son (Deuteronomy 21:18) and the adulterous bride (Deuteronomy 22:23–27) were likewise held responsible for their acts without any prior enquiry as to their age at the commission of the crime. No special provision was made for criminal lunatics.
In certain cases, the law itself afforded an excuse for the commission of an act, which could otherwise have been considered criminal. Even after the introduction of regular courts, the redeemer of blood was excused if he killed the slayer outside a city of asylum (Numbers 35:27). The owner of a house who killed a thief in the act of breaking in at night was likewise forgiven (Exodus 22:2).12 Moreover, in cases of public apostasy it was considered the duty of everyone present to take the law into his own hands, and punish the offender (Exodus 32:27; Numbers 25:7). Whereas a man who killed his slave was punished in the same way as the slayer of a freeman: he was acquitted if the slave survived for a day or two.13 The reason given, viz., the slave "is his money" (Exodus 21:21), implied that a man would not intentionally kill his slave and that the loss of property was already sufficient punishment.
Hebrew law, like that of other peoples,14 distinguished between intentional and unintentional crimes. The latter needed religious expiation only (Exodus 21:13–14; Numbers 15:27–31; 35:11; Deuteronomy 17:12). Ignorance of the law and mistakes of fact were recognized as excuses and the accused would be allowed to go free after atoning for his misdeed (Leviticus 4:13–20).15 Acts committed under duress would likewise not be considered punishable; e.g., a betrothed woman raped in the countryside was presumed to have been forced into the act (Deuteronomy 22:26).16
There are various rules with regard to causation, negligence, and act of God. According to Exodus 21:13, the slayer was not punishable if he had "not waited for the victim but God had let him fall into his hand." This seems to cover even negligent behavior on his part—any unintentional killing being called an act of God. The provisions of Exodus 21:22–25 (striking a pregnant woman during a quarrel between men)17 and Exodus 21:28–30 (a dangerous ox killing a person) seem to be less lenient owing to the presence of mens rea on the part of the accused. This rule appears similar to the principle of "malice aforethought" in English criminal law, as expounded, for example, in Director of Public Prosecutions v. Beard  A.C. 479. The absence of mens rea was also the idea underlying the other passages on manslaughter (Numbers 35; Deuteronomy 19:4–13).18
Since the emphasis was put upon the absence of a guilty mind, the law also held a man responsible for the acts of his servants performed under his orders. This seems to be implied in the story of Uriah's fatal mission (2 Samuel 11–12), where David rather than Joab was blamed for the murder.19 Besides the previously mentioned criminal liability for the fatal acts of beasts, there existed a civil obligation of their owner to make good any damage caused by them. This rule also applied to lifeless chattels, if their owner had been negligent (Exodus 21:28–32; 22:4–5).20
As to acts committed by the accused himself, it was apparently the rule that no punishment would be imposed unless the actus reus was completed. An attempted crime was punishable only in the case of bearing false witness (Deuteronomy 19:19); here the false accusation was itself considered to be a criminal act.21
2. The Crimes
Apart from private wrongs, which will be treated later, crime is taken to mean those acts the suppression of which is the concern of the community. The sharpness of this definition is, however, lost when we consider that most crimes were originally dealt with by private vengeance, followed, later on, by a private action on the part of the offended party or his relatives.
As already mentioned, idolatry and other forms of insurrection against the suzerainty of God were the most serious of crimes. Disobedience to any decision delivered "before God," (Deuteronomy 17:12), and the cursing of a ruler of the people (Exodus 22:27; 2 Samuel 16:9; 1 Kings 2:8; 21:10) were likewise heinous offenses. The laws being formulated in the pre-monarchical period, there exist no provisions concerning disobedience to the king (compare Joshua 1:18; Tosefta Terumot 7:20), or political offenses in general.
Various offenses are connected with the traditional structure of the family. Ill-treatment of the parents (Exodus 21:15, 17), as well as rebellion against them (Deuteronomy 21:18), come under this heading.22 Similar to the provisions in other oriental laws,23 incest and unnatural relations are the subjects of many a section of Hebrew law (Leviticus 18; 20). Adultery of a housewife, moreover, changed at quite an early stage from a mere private wrong against the husband into a serious offense (Numbers 5:11–31; Deuteronomy 22:20–22).24
Since adultery by a wife had such grave consequences, there was need for a provision regarding false charges of unchastity. A man wrongfully accusing his bride could be sued by his father-in-law (Deuteronomy 22:13–19).25 On the other hand, offenses against unmarried women were treated rather leniently; the offender was merely compelled to marry the girl and to pay a sum of money to her father (Exodus 22:15–16; Deuteronomy 22:28–19).26
Cases of murder, as mentioned above, were not originally considered to be of public concern but only of consequence to the relatives of the victim.27 Besides the obligation placed upon the redeemer of blood, there also existed the religious idea of pollution, which in turn was connected with the institution of the asylum and the distinction between intentional and unintentional acts (see Exodus 21:12–14; Numbers 35; Deuteronomy 19:4–13). Biblical law, in fact, represents the transition from tribal revenge to judicial procedure, the latter being necessary once mens rea was recognized as a prerequisite to crime. The murderer, therefore, could no longer compound his offense, as was the earlier rule,28 but had to undergo public punishment. In a similar fashion, the right of asylum was restricted to cases of unpremeditated killing, which were adjudicated by the elders. The various cities chosen for this purpose in the different parts of the country had meanwhile taken the place of the single place of asylum in the central sanctuary. The stay in these places was, thus, a kind of punishment rather than an enjoyment of divine protection. Its duration was limited to the lifetime of the high priest.29
Kidnapping a free person and selling him into slavery was also a capital crime (Exodus 21:16; Deuteronomy 24:7).30 Ordinary assault, on the other hand, appears to have been in an intermediate stage, between the Babylonian rule of talion and the Hittite provisions for the payment of damages.31 Originally, the victim was entitled to inflict the same injury upon the attacker, "a life for a life, an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth, a hand for a hand, a foot for a foot, burning for burning, wound for wound, stripe for stripe" (Exodus 21:23–25; Leviticus 24:18–20; Deuteronomy 19:21). In practice, however, the accused could make good the injury by paying a penalty fixed by the aggrieved party (Exodus 21:22, 30).
A crime punished by retaliation was the making of a false accusation by a witness (Deuteronomy 19:16–21). The payment of compensation did not seem to be applicable to this offense.32 Another heinous crime was the intervention of a woman in an affray between men by grasping the sexual organ of one of the combatants (Deuteronomy 25:11–12). The law expressly excluded the composition in such a case and demanded the mutilation to be carried out against the guilty party.33
On the other hand, violations of property rights were usually treated only as civil wrongs, giving rise to actions for restitution or fines.34
The tribal system of revenge was replaced by the fixed forms of punishment provided by the law collections of the Pentateuch. The unrestricted power of the injured party over the person of the assailant was limited by the system of talion, which was applied in cases of murder, causing bodily harm, and bearing false witness.35 In practice, however, the crime was often compounded by the payment of a ransom (Exodus 21:30), though Numbers 35:31–33 excluded this usage with regard to murder.36 There also existed a case of "mirroring punishment," viz., the woman seizing a man's testicles lost her hand (Deuteronomy 25:11).37
Capital punishment in cases other than murder was intended to purify the community and the country, and to safeguard the existence of the covenant between God and Israel. The death penalty, moreover, was used as a public deterrent (Deuteronomy 17:12–13) as well as a means of atonement for the culprit (Babylonian Talmud Yoma 86a).
The execution of a murderer was left to the discretion of the redeemer of blood, while persons put to death for public crimes were mostly stoned and then hanged.38 For grave sexual offenses the execution took the form of burning (Genesis 38:24; Leviticus 20:14; 21:9).39 The idolatrous city and persons executed by the king were put to death by the sword, like the enemy killed in battle (Deuteronomy 13:16).40
Flogging was the penalty for less heinous offenses, such as a fight between two persons (Deuteronomy 25:1–3), or, perhaps, for first offenses in general (Deuteronomy 21:18; 22:18).41 We have seen already that the power to inflict this penalty was perhaps included in the Persian privilege given to the postexilic Jewish courts (Ezra 7:26).42
At the same time, mention was also made of the privilege to impose sentences of imprisonment, a penalty that does not seem to have been in use in preexilic times. Leviticus 24:12, Numbers 15:34, and similar passages deal with cases of arrest rather than of punishment.43
Payment of a fine was another penalty permitted by the Persian charter. Since Hebrew practice knew only of composition or restitution made to the injured party, there was usually no penal confiscation of property.44 The nearest thing to a fine seems to have been the multiple payment to the prosecutor imposed on a thief (Exodus 22:1; 2 Samuel 12:6; Proverbs 6:31). Rebellion against the king was punished by confiscation of the culprit's property in addition to his death in the case of Naboth (1 Kings 21). Certain sins against God could be wiped out by making amends to the priests (2 Kings 12:16). The Jewish community having been empowered by the Persian king to impose fines, decided to confiscate all the property of persons who ignored the summons to the assembly (Ezra 10:8). The goods were apparently devoted to the use of the temple.
Most effective was another penalty mentioned with regard to the assembly convened by Ezra: the banishment from the congregation of the exiles (Ezra 10:8). This punishment included loss of property and was rather severe in a period when a person's protection depended upon his kinship.45
In the tribal age, such a person was even declared sacred, meaning that he and his family were to be given as a burnt offering to God (Joshua 7) and that anybody coming into contact with him would share his fate. This usage was originally part of the holy war ritual of Israel, as of other nations,46 and was applied as a penalty for grave offenses against the divinity (Leviticus 27:29).47
4. Compensation and Restitution
The earliest payments intended to make good a wrong took the form of a compensation, the amount being fixed by the offended party (Exodus 21:30). In the course of time, however, the sum was determined by law or by an independent tribunal and the injured party had to be satisfied with the amount so awarded.
Since retaliation was the only recognized punishment for murder, there was no tariff for that crime in Hebrew law, contrary, for instance, to the Hittite Laws, or contemporary Bedouin procedure.48 Cases of assault, on the other hand, were settled by payment of a compensation fixed by the injured party and confirmed by the judge: "He shall be fined according as the woman's husband shall lay upon him, and he shall pay as the judges determine" (Exodus 21:22). The judicial decision was based upon the actual damage suffered and took into account loss of time and the cost of healing (Exodus 21:19).49
Compensation for loss suffered was also the object of the payments imposed upon the seducer, the rapist, and the person who falsely accused his bride (Exodus 22:16; Deuteronomy 22:19, 29). Cases of rape, it seems, were originally the concern of the aggrieved kinship group. The slur on the family's honor could be wiped out only by the attacker's death, as illustrated by Genesis 34.50 After the settlement, however, capital punishment was reserved for the rape of a married or betrothed woman, while the rape of a girl could be compounded by payment of a fine and the marriage of the attacker and the victim. In each of these cases, the penalty depended upon the standard bride-price of a virgin and the accused had to pay the actual or intended damage.51
Originally, a person causing damage to property seems to have been required to supply a new chattel, as shown by the term shalem (Exodus 21:36; 22:4; Leviticus 24:18).52 Only at a later stage did compensation take the form of a payment of the damage (Exodus 21:34). As in Babylonian law,53 the chief cause of injury was the goring ox; mention was also made of unguarded pits, fires, and cattle trespass (Exodus 21:33; 22:4–5).54 No tariff was fixed for damage to immovables or animals, but the amount payable for the negligent killing of a slave was standardized (Exodus 21:32).55
In contrast to the Laws of Hammurabi 22–23, Hebrew law did not deal severely with robbery but remained content with the restitution of the chattel plus one fifth of its value and a religious expiation (Leviticus 6:5). Encroachment upon one's neighbor's property was also considered to be a serious religious offense (Deuteronomy 19:14; 27:17), although no penal sanction was provided.56 It was rather the concern of God to see to it that the land was restored to its rightful tenant; this idea also existed among the Greeks and Romans.57
The finder of a lost chattel was supposed to return it to its owner (Exodus 23:4; Deuteronomy 22:1–3). If he denied the finding, he too was required only to restore the goods together with one fifth of their value and to offer a sacrifice (Leviticus 6:1–6).58
Larceny was dealt with more severely, even though much more leniently than in other oriental laws.59 The ordinary penalty was restitution to the owner together with payment of 100 to 400 percent of the value (Exodus 22:1; 22:3, 6; 2 Samuel 12:6; Proverbs 6:31).
Kidnapping, on the other hand, was punishable by death (Exodus 21:16). Where a thief was unable to restore the chattel together with the penalty, he was sold into serfdom for the prosecutor's benefit (Exodus 22:3). There were no special rules regarding theft from the sanctuary, except for the conversion of goods dedicated to God in the form of the ban, mentioned above. The case of Rachel's theft of the household gods illustrates the earlier procedure of pursuit and search; this has been convincingly pointed out by Daube.60 A bailee found guilty of converting the deposit to his own use was treated like a thief (Exodus 22:7).61 There were no penal provisions, however, with regard to receiving stolen property.62
1. Codex Hammurabi 23; for Nuzian parallels, compare Cyrus H. Gordon, "Biblical Customs and the Nuzu Tablets," Biblical Archaeologist 3 (1940): 11.
2. Ephraim Neufeld, Hittite Laws (London: Luzac, 1951), 116; Godfrey R. Driver and John C. Miles, The Babylonian Laws (Oxford: Clarendon, 1952–55), 1:501.
3. See Codex Hammurabi 23.
4. Jeremiah 31:28 and Ezekiel 18, it is true, put special emphasis on the idea of individual responsibility, but they do not formulate it for the first time.
5. Codex Hammurabi 116, 210, 230; Hittite Laws 44a; on the other hand, see Middle Assyrian Laws A2.
6. David Daube, Studies in Biblical Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1947), 154ff.; P. J. Verdam, "On ne fera point mourir les enfants pour les pères en droit biblique," Revue Internationale des Droits de l'Antiquité 3 (1949): 393–416; Herbert G. May, "Individual Responsibility and Retribution," Hebrew Union College Annual 32 (1961): 107–20; Ze'ev W. Falk, "Collective Responsibility in the Bible and the Aggada" (in Hebrew), Tarbiz 30 (1961): 16–20; Meir Weiss, "Some Problems of the Biblical Doctrine of Retribution" (in Hebrew), Tarbiz 31 (1962): 236–63.
7. Falk, "Collective Responsibility," 16–20.
8. Jacob Heinemann, "Transgression" (in Hebrew), in Encyclopaedia Miqra'it (Jerusalem: Bialik, 1950), 3:99; Harold H. Rowley, The Faith of Israel (London: Westminster, 1956), 86–87; Klaus Koch, "Der Spruch, 'Sein Blut bleibe auf seinem Haupt' und die israelitische Auffassung vom vergossenen Blut," Vetus Testamentum 12 (1962): 396ff.
9. Neufeld, Hittite Laws, 199.
10. For a rationalization of these primitive provisions, compare Mishnah Sanhedrin 7:4. See Victor Aptowitzer, "The Rewarding and Punishing of Animals and Inanimate Objects," Hebrew Union College Annual 3 (1926): 117ff.
11. Driver and Miles, Babylonian Laws, 1:444; Frederick Pollock and Frederic W. Maitland, The History of English Law before the Time of Edward I, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1923), 2:472–73.
12. Compare Codex Eshnunna 12–13; Codex Hammurabi 21.
13. Compare the English "a year and a day" rule: R. v. Dyson (1908) 2 K.B. 454.
14. Codex Hammurabi 206; Neufeld, Hittite Laws, 3–4.
15. Compare David Daube, Revue Internationale des Droits de l'Antiquité 2 (1949): 189ff.; Sin, Ignorance and Forgiveness in the Bible (London: Liberal Jewish Synagogue, 1961); Cohen, "Self Help in the Jewish and Roman Law," Revue Internationale des Droits de l'Antiquité 3 (1955): 107ff.; Eprhaim Neufeld, "Self-Help," Revue Internationale des Droits de l'Antiquité 5 (1958): 291; Karel, Sinai 18 (1946): 106ff.; L. Freund Volume (Tel Aviv, 1954), 21ff.
16. Codex Hammurabi 130; Middle Assyrian Laws A12; Neufeld, Hittite Laws, 197.
17. Compare Codex Hammurabi 209–12.
18. Otherwise, see Driver and Miles, Babylonian Laws, 1:315.
19. This was also the elder rule of Talmudic law; compare Josephus, Antiquities, 14.9.4; Babylonian Talmud Qidushin 43a. For Greek law, see John W. Jones, The Law and Legal Theory of the Greeks (Oxford: Clarendon, 1956), 266.
20. Compare David Daube, "Direct and Indirect Causation in Biblical Law," Vetus Testamentum 11 (1961): 246–69.
21. Compare Josephus, Antiquities, 12.9.1.
22. Compare Codex Hammurabi 168–69, and for Greek parallels, see Driver and Miles, Babylonian Laws, 1:348. See also Ephraim Neufeld, Ancient Hebrew Marriage Laws (London: Longmans, 1944), 254; Abraham Freimann, "Rebellious Son" (in Hebrew), in Encyclopaedia Miqra'it, 2:160; Samuel E. Loewenstamm, "Son Hit His Father and Mother" (in Hebrew), in Encyclopaedia Miqra'it, 4:951.
23. Codex Hammurabi 154–58; Middle Assyrian Laws A19–20; Neufeld, Hittite Laws, 187–200. Compare Samuel E. Loewenstamm, "Whoredom" (in Hebrew), in Encyclopaedia Miqra'it, 2:935.
24. Compare Codex Eshnunna 27–28; Codex Hammurabi 129–32; Middle Assyrian Laws A13; Neufeld, Hittite Laws, 198; compare Walter J. Kornfeld, "L'adultère dans l'Orient Antique," Revue Biblique 57 (1950): 92–105; Greenberg, "Some Postulates of Biblical Criminal Law," in Yehezkel Kaufmann Jubilee Volume: Studies in Bible and Jewish Religion, ed. Menachem Haran (Jerusalem: Magnes, 1960), 5ff.; Loewenstamm, Bulletin of the Israel Society for Biblical Research (in Hebrew), 7 (1962): 55ff.
25. Compare Codex Hammurabi 127, 131; Middle Assyrian Laws A17, 19.
26. Compare Middle Assyrian Laws A55–56. See Neufeld, Ancient Hebrew Marriage Laws, 95ff.; Louis M. Epstein, Sex Laws and Customs in Judaism (New York: Bloch, 1948), 155ff.; Elijah S. Hartum, "Virgin" (in Hebrew), in Encyclopaedia Miqra'it, 2:381. For the violation of a servant, compare Codex Eshnunna 31.
27. Compare Koch, "Der Spruch, 'Sein Blut bleibe auf seinem Haupt' und die israelitische Auffassung vom vergossenen Blut," Vetus Testamentum 12 (1962): 396ff.
28. Compare Middle Assyrian Laws A10, B2; Neufeld, Hittite Laws, 1. See also Samuel I. Feigin, Hatequfah 30–31 (1947): 747ff.
29. Ben Zion Dinur, Eretz Israel 3 (1954): 135; Chaim Z. Hirschberg, "Blood Vengeance" (in Hebrew), in Encyclopaedia Miqra'it, 2:392; Roland de Vaux, Ancient Israel: Its Life and Institutions, trans. John McHugh (London: Darton, 1961), 247; Moshe Greenberg, "The Biblical Concept of Asylum," Journal of Biblical Literature 78 (1959): 125–26.
30. Compare Codex Hammurabi 14; Neufeld, Hittite Laws, 19–20; Samuel E. Loewenstamm, "Theft of the Soul" (in Hebrew), in Encyclopaedia Miqra'it, 2:538; Daube, Studies in Biblical Law, 94ff.
31. Codex Hammurabi 195–214; Neufeld, Hittite Laws, 11–18.
32. Codex Hammurabi 1–4; Driver and Miles, Babylonian Laws, 1:58ff.
33. Compare Middle Assyrian Laws A7–8; Godfrey R. Driver and John C. Miles, trans., The Assyrian Laws (Oxford: Clarendon, 1936), 30, 354–55; Samuel E. Loewenstamm, "Genitalia" (in Hebrew), in Encyclopaedia Miqra'it, 4:610.
34. Compare Friedrich Horst, Gottes Recht: Gesammelte Studien zum Recht im Alten Testament (Munich: Kaiser, 1961), 167ff., and see pp. 75–76.
35. Compare Codex Hammurabi 3–4, 196–97, 200, 229–30; Neufeld, Hittite Laws, 92a, 121a; L.12 table 8:2; Samuel E. Loewenstamm, "Lex Talionis" (in Hebrew), in Encyclopaedia Miqra'it, 4:840. Compare the whole section with de Vaux, Ancient Israel, 244ff.
36. Samuel E. Loewenstamm, "Ransom" (in Hebrew), in Encyclopaedia Miqra'it, 4:231; Ephraim A. Speiser, "Census and Ritual Expiation in Mari and Israel," Bulletin of the American Schools of Oriental Research 149 (1958): 17ff.
37. Compare Codex Hammurabi 192–95, 218, 226, 253.
38. Samuel E. Loewenstamm, "Hanging," 2:798, and "Capital Punishment" (in Hebrew), in Encyclopaedia Miqra'it, 4:946; de Vaux, Ancient Israel, 244.
39. On the punishment for adultery, see David Daube, Origen and the Punishment of Adultery in Jewish Law (Berlin: Akademie, 1957), 110; and Joseph Blinzler, "Die Strafe für Ehebruch in Bibel und Halacha," New Testament Studies 4 (1958): 32–47; Kornfeld, "L'adultère dans L'Orient Antique," 92–109.
40. Loewenstamm, "Hanging," 2:798, and "Capital Punishment," 4:946.
41. Compare Codex Hammurabi 202; Middle Assyrian Laws A7–8; Samuel E. Loewenstamm, "Flogging" (in Hebrew), in Encyclopaedia Miqra'it, 4:1160.
42. Ze'ev W. Falk, "Exodus 21:6," Vetus Testamentum 9 (1959): 89; see p. 38.
43. Samuel E. Loewenstamm, "Imprisoned" (in Hebrew), in Encyclopaedia Miqra'it, 1:476; Editorial Board, "Prison" (in Hebrew), in Encyclopaedia Miqra'it, 2:82.
44. Fines payable to the royal palace were also abolished in the Hittite Laws, 9, 25. Compare Driver and Miles, Babylonian Laws, 1:500.
45. Compare Codex Hammurabi 154.
46. De Vaux, Ancient Israel, 2:76; Samuel E. Loewenstamm, "Excommunication" (in Hebrew), in Encyclopaedia Miqra'it, 3:290.
47. Compare the Roman sacer homo, Theodor Mommsen, Römisches Strafrecht (Munich: Beck, 1982), 900ff.; K. Hofmann, Reallexicon für Antike und Christentum, 1:428. See Christianus H. W. Brekelmans, De Herem in het OT (Nijmegen: Centrale Drukerij, 1959).
48. There exists only the cultic ransom of half a sheqel; Exodus 30:11–12; compare Loewenstamm, "Ransom," 4:231.
49. Compare Codex Eshnunna 42–48; Codex Hammurabi 203, 206, 209–10.
50. Raphael Patai, Family, Love and the Bible (London: Macgibbon and Kee, 1960), 94ff.
51. De Vaux, Ancient Israel, 246; Hartum, "Virgin," 2:381.
52. Daube, Studies in Biblical Law, 134–44. Compare Richard Haase, Zeitschrift für die vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft 66 (1964): 178.
53. Codex Eshnunna 53–55, 58; Codex Hammurabi 250–52.
54. See Adrianus van Selms, Archiv Orientální 18 (1950): 4:321ff.; Elias J. Bickerman, "Two Legal Interpretations of the Septuagint," Revue Internationale des Droits de l'Antiquité 3 (1956): 97ff.
55. Compare Leviticus 27:3–4; Codex Hammurabi 250–52.
56. Compare Daube, Studies in Biblical Law, 94ff.; David Daube, "Robbery" (in Hebrew), in Encyclopaedia Miqra'it, 2:464; Samuel E. Loewenstamm, "Theft" (in Hebrew), in Encyclopaedia Miqra'it, 2:536.
57. Elijah S. Hartum, "Trespassing" (in Hebrew), in Encyclopaedia Miqra'it, 2:395. Compare Middle Assyrian Laws B8–15; Driver and Miles, Assyrian Laws, 302–5.
58. Compare Neufeld, Hittite Laws, 45, 60–62, 66, 71. Chaim Z. Hirschberg, "Casualties" (in Hebrew), in Encyclopaedia Miqra'it, 1:1.
59. Compare Codex Eshnunna 6, 12–13; Codex Hammurabi 6–13, 21–23, 259–60; Middle Assyrian Laws A1, 3–5; Neufeld, Hittite Laws, 91–97, 101–3, 119–43; Loewenstamm, "Theft," 2:536; Horst, Gottes Recht, 167ff.
60. Daube, Studies in Biblical Law, 201ff.
61. Compare Codex Hammurabi 120, 124, 265.
62. Compare Codex Eshnunna 40; Codex Hammurabi 7, 9.