Part 2: Proposition 5 and Proposition 6
Proposition 5. The Sophic claims (A) all knowledge for its province, to the exclusion of all other claimants and the (B) rejection of all other approaches. (C) It is as aggressive as it is negative, and (D) is filled with a crusading and reforming zeal.
A. Its province is all knowledge.
Modern Statements: "Theoretical science is the attempt to uncover an ultimate and comprehensive set of axioms (including mathematical rules) from which all the phenomena of the world could be shown to follow by deductive steps."1 "The West has suffered from an excess of subjectizing the world. When it does not know something, it denies its existence. . . . That which is not seen has never existed. . . . The tactic of suppressing that which is not known is ancient indeed in the scientific petulance of the West."2 "One thing that disturbs me is the idea that science can solve everything. . . . What man chooses to do with the discoveries of science and their applications is beyond science."3
Ancient Statements: Aristotle's great scientific encyclopedia was handed down through the generations as the compendium of all knowledge, "diluted to the utmost and rendered as far as possible mechanical."4 As such it was effectively employed by the Sophists. The Summas of the Scholastic philosophers assert the totality of their knowledge: what is not in their book does not exist.
B. At the same time it claims to be the only door to knowledge, all or partial.
Modern Statements: "No, our science is no illusion. But an illusion it would be to suppose that what science cannot give us we can get elsewhere."5 "Modern Science . . . claims that the whole range of phenomena, mental as well as physical—the entire universe—is its field. It asserts that the scientific method is the sole gateway to the whole region of knowledge."6 "The fundamental principle of science is that it concerns itself exclusively with what can be demonstrated, and does not allow itself to be influenced by personal opinions or sayings of anybody. This is why the motto of the Royal Society of London is Nullus in verba: we take no man's word for anything."7
Ancient Statements: Aristotle's "analytical spirit . . . found its food in positive science," which is based on the "the Hellenistic pictures of the world, self-sufficient, emphasizing totality, . . . [though] far removed from living research"—research that was rendered unnecessary by the all-embracing nature of the system; the method was the answer, the medium was the message.8 It was the intention of the philosophers to supplant the poets as the complete guides to knowledge.9 "The Hellenistic systems . . . dogmatically construct a fixed picture of the world out of 'valid propositions,' and in this safe shell they seek refuge from the storms of life."10
C. The others are not only ignorant, they are thieves and pretenders: the Mantic must be harried out of the land.
Modern Statements: The fallacies of Scientism are that (1) "Science . . . alone is sufficient to lead us to truth." (2) Science can save us. (3) Objectivism: only the tangible and observable are real. (4) "Anything and everything . . . can be understood best in terms of its earlier and simpler stages." (5) It has a contempt for history. (6) It "involves such dogmas as determinism and relativism." (7) It "enhances the pernicious cult of power."11 Thus the geologist of Richard McKenna's "The Secret Place" proclaims, "I am as positivistic a scientist as you will find. . . . The students blush and hate me, but it is for their own good. Science is the only safe game, and it's safe only if it is kept pure."12 "Science has not only progressively reduced the competence of philosophy, but it has also attempted to suppress it altogether and to replace it by its own claim to universality."13 "The touchstone of science is the universal validity of its results for all normally constituted and duly instructed minds. . . . The glitter of the great metaphysical systems becomes dross when tried by this touchstone." Science claims not only exclusive right to the territory it has occupied but also to any "territory that science has not yet effectively occupied."14 "All other philosophy is sheer humbug. . . . There can be no wisdom without the correct worldview of our generation."15 "Do not be bullied by authoritative pronouncements about what machines will never do. Such statements are based upon pride."16 Is this claim that we can design machines that will do anything at all an expression of great humility? "Whenever, therefore, we are tempted to desert the scientific method of seeking truth, whenever the silence of science suggests that some other gateway must be sought to knowledge, let us inquire first whether the . . . problem . . . arise[s] from a superstition," etc. If not, then we must not look elsewhere, but must be patient and await the scientific answer, even though we wait hundreds of years for it;17 patience is here the escape hatch.
Ancient Statements: Rabbi Eliezer asks, "Who is worse—the one who says to the king, 'Either you or I will dwell in the palace,' or the one who says, 'Neither you nor I will dwell in the palace'?" The former is far worse, and that is the position the Sophic takes. Its justification is that of the man who had a wine cellar, "He opened one barrel and found it sour, another and found it sour, and a third and found it sour." And he said," 'This satisfies me that all the barrels are unfit!' " Is he justified?18 The purpose and practice of the Schools was to make it possible formally and legally to ostracize all who did not share one's point of view. This is intolerance more characteristic of the Sophically oriented West than of the pluralistic and Mantic East; it is not characteristic of religions in general, but of scientists and of religions which have accommodated themselves to the Sophic views of the time, such as the Schools of Alexandria, Pumbadetha, Basra, and so forth.19 The tyranny of the Schools needs no illustration for college students of any period of Western civilization! It is our Sophic heritage.
D. Not content merely with its own researches, the Sophic undertakes with evangelical zeal to reform the follies of the Mantic.
"After the publication of the Origin of Species a controversy arose in Europe and America. It was a struggle between the Christian theological conception of man and the conception held by science. . . . If you were in this controversy, . . . you were either for religion or you were for science."20 "For Huxley . . . the battle against the doctrine of inspiration, whether plenary or otherwise, was the crucial engagement in the fight for evolution and for stopped freedom of scientific inquiry."21 "In all parts of the world [evolution] has dealt a mortal blow to the traditional and superstitious mythologies with which men of all races have decorated their ideas about human origins."22 "The most important responsibilities of the geologists involve . . . [freeing] people from the myths of Biblical creation. Many millions still live in mental bondage controlled by ignorant ranters who accept the Bible as the last word in science."23 "The failure of our people to take evolution seriously can be traced to . . . our domination by antiquated religious traditions."24
Proposition 6. The Mantic has its own peculiar (A) flaws and (B) advantages. In the long run it is preferable to the Sophic.
A. Since the Mantic makes allowance for the things beyond human control, it is less tightly bound by determinism than the Sophic; Mantic thinking enjoys greater flexibility and latitude, and this opens the door to all kinds of quacks and pretenders. It is these who supply the Sophic with its causa belli and its ammunition.
Modern Statements: Newton, though firmly believing in God, could not accept the denatured and abstract religious teachings of his day, the result of centuries of eager accommodation by religionists to the prevailing science of their times. He turned from a denatured Mantic tradition to a straightforward literal understanding of the Scriptures, which for him was completely consistent with the literal and tangible nature of his scientifically constructed universe.25 Like the Sophic, the Mantic practitioners form schools which are even more retrograde to the Mantic spirit than to the Sophic, since they define, control, reward, and punish orthodoxy and heresy. The Mantic is defective in two ways: through too much control and too little. On the one hand, the schoolmen rigidly define, reward, and punish orthodoxy and heresy; on the other, wild-eyed sectaries and individuals go to completely irresponsible excesses. The essence of the Mantic, as the Didache points out, is that it cannot be judged: who can tell when another is receiving inspiration or not? Years of religious oppression and suppression have given all religion a bad name. The abuses of the Mantic are real, but they are not the whole story.
Ancient Statements: It was as a reaction to the excesses of Orphism that "Greece . . . enshrined the worldly wisdom of men who stood wholly aloof from mystic excitements and sought for no revelation, in the fiction of the Seven Sages."26 There is evidence that Apollo and Athena were in early times the sober and Sophic successors of the more mystic religion of the Earth-goddess, though their cults were also highly Mantic in nature, "this new [method] of mantike [by] inspired prophets" supplanting the more "primitive" divination of chthonian allure27 because of the abuses of the latter. The Sophic invasion of the mid-fifth century was a further step in the same direction in the manner in which the Darwinian cult became a religious follow-up as it were of the Reformation; but Darwinism went much further than the preceding reformation and abolished the whole religious tradition.28 The schools took over aggressively and eagerly, completely supplanting their Mantic predecessors, the inspired poets who were "older . . . and considered themselves much wiser."29
B. In spite of its susceptibility to abuses, Mantic free-wheeling has the advantage of the Sophic, which necessarily takes a posture of unshakeable integrity and undeviating rightness, thus placing its pretensions in a very vulnerable position.
Modern Statements: "The university is based upon scrupulous honesty of thought; and that honesty must expire at the portal of the three sectarian chapels," i.e., it is pure and cannot look upon faith with the least degree of allowance.30 This means that the flexible Mantic enjoys an advantage over the brittle Sophic: "Computers usually work with much greater accuracy than the human brain but if any element in a computer becomes faulty then catastrophic errors occur. . . . In contrast to this . . . the brain does not break down completely and, although much information processing is done rather inaccurately, the result is almost never complete nonsense," i.e., it is the infallible Sophic machine and not the bungling Mantic imagination which runs the greater risk.31 "The [Sophic] idea that we can at will, and preparatory to scientific discovery, purge our mind from prejudices . . . is naive and mistaken. . . . The rule 'purge yourself from prejudice' can therefore have only the dangerous result that, after having made an attempt or two, you think you are now free from prejudices—which means, of course, that you will stick only more tenaciously to your unconscious prejudices and dogmas."32
The posture of uprightness and perfect integrity is an occupational necessity to the Sophist, but it makes him very vulnerable and therefore all the more touchy and authoritarian.33 Thus it insists upon such-and-such an explanation, for example, "that the Darwinian mechanism is the only possible one," ignoring the fact that "the number of competing theories is always infinite," and thereby closing the door to the untrammeled explorations it advocates.34 The strength of the Mantic is that it not only leaves the door open, but is willing to look behind the door; its open-mindedness is now recommended to science: "Science is not a system of certain, or well-established statements; nor is it a system which steadily advances toward a state of finality. . . . Every scientific statement must remain tentative forever. . . . Science does not rest upon rock-bottom," but "above a swamp."35 The unflinching scientific discipline that was the pride and boast of the Berlin school of Classical and Oriental scholarship at the turn of the century not only deprived its representative of the opportunity to make great discoveries, but by its relentless skepticism frequently led them into paths of error, according to Eduard Meyer.36
Paradoxically, scientists often pay tribute to intuition, the one thing that strict objectivity will not allow. Thus Darwin in the jungle: "No one can stand in these solitudes unmoved, and not feel that there is more in man than the mere breath of his body."37 "The favorite child of Darwinism is blind chance," but the amazing perfection and complexity of biological processes now rules this out: "If one will only let the transcendent nature of every organic phenomenon work upon him, one will then discern the very opposite of anything like chance."38 In science, "progress has only been possible by again and again returning to the observation of the world as it is, by stepping out of the laboratory and the dissecting room (and I would add the study), into the open air, forgetting for the time at least the abstract methods, the images and models, the selected and prepared specimens of the scientific student."39 In theoretical physics "even a partial reversal of causal relations means the substitution of the question 'What for?' for the question 'Why?' . . . The question which begins a child's cognition of the world may also prove legitimate in the exact sciences."40 Aside from intuition, man possesses a sensitivity of sight and hearing which far excels that of scientific instruments, and which should be trusted.41
This recognition of the intuitive embarrasses the Sophic. After announcing that "the element of constructive invention, of . . . intuition . . . remains the core of any mathematical achievement," Richard Courant and Herbert Robbins warn the student that "for scientific procedure it is important to discard elements of metaphysical character and to consider observable facts always as the ultimate source of notions and constructions," and thus reap the "reward for courageous adherence to the principle of eliminating metaphysics."42 For always the idea is that "two different paths" lead to knowledge. "The first, revelation, . . . is closed to a great many people and independent of rational thought. . . . The second, on the contrary, is strictly rational and scientific"—we cannot mix them.43 As a result, "scientific philosophy" is a contradiction, "the invention of thinkers devoid of any true philosophical gift or vocation. . . . Intuition is the sine qua non of philosophy. . . . Philosophical intuition cannot be deduced from anything else; it is primary."44 "No scientist has the slightest idea what mass attraction is. . . . Though popularly unrealized . . . the origins of science are inherently immersed in an a priori mystery."45 "They try to 'cover up' their ignorance by asserting that no fundamental mystery exists. . . . And the why-for and how-come . . . of all the known family of . . . generalized principles—thus far discovered by scientific observation— . . . are all and together Absolute mystery. . . . Therefore in direct contradiction to present specialization, all educational processes must henceforth commence at the most comprehensive level . . . that consists of the earnest attempt to embrace the whole eternally regenerative phenomenon Scenario Universe. And this is what children try to do spontaneously [see Kozyrev above]. . . . Perversely, the parents tell them to forget [the] Universe and to concentrate with A, B, C, 1, 2, and 3. . . . Human life contains the weightless omnipowerful, omniknowing metaphysical intellect which alone can comprehend, sort out, select, integrate, coordinate and cohere."46
Ancient Statements: The arrogance of the Sophic over the Mantic, and the disastrous results of this hubris, is the subject of much of the best Greek literature. Since our schools are Sophic, this fact has been completely over-looked where it has not been actually covered up. Heraclitus, Pindar, Plato, Aristophanes, Sophocles, and Euripides are full of gibes at the conceit of the know-it-all professors and of warnings against their insidious teachings.47 Aristophanes' first play was a biting satire on the Athenian youth and the new education of "the skeptical purpose, and the insidious sophistic"48 that was making them what they were; "they were full of strange information, and sometimes of shocking beliefs and disbeliefs, which they had learnt from the professional 'sophists' or men of learning."49
It was the Sophists who effected the death of Socrates, accusing him of sacrilege and of leading the youth astray, the very things of which they were guilty; and the schoolmen to this day love to represent Socrates as going about barefoot in Athens debunking not the Sophic intellectuals (which were his particular target) but the Mantic traditions of the fathers—which he always supported. "Socrates turned away from Ionic Philosophy though his study of natural science continued: he overcame the skepticism and individualism of the Sophists, but was himself transformed into the [champion and] image of the free-thinker," so that "the dismantling (Zersetzungsprozess) of religion" went on unimpeded—in his name.50 For those philosophers who recognized the necessity and importance of the Mantic, the intellectual quest did not end: for them philosophy is a middle road, "the suspension between ignorance and 'wisdom.' " Aristotle did not think of philosophy as the "totality of all knowledge."51 It was all the same tradition, the Sophic itself being "a residue of the dogmatic way of thinking" of the earlier Mantic,52 operating on a different level rather than the replacing of one authority by another.53 Philosophy occupied for a while the middle ground.54
C. Those whom the Sophic claims for its greatest representatives lean strongly toward the Mantic, though the Sophic proposition condemns any such concessions.
Modern Statements: Newton is a shining example of this. Dr. Ernest Jones commented, "Most of Newton's biographers have suppressed the important fact that throughout his life theology was much more important to him than science, and, moreover, theology of a peculiarly arid and bigoted order."55 The literalism of Newton's religious beliefs, which did not concur with the prevailing religious teachings of his time, shocks Dr. Jones as a scientist. As to the all-sufficiency of matter, "That gravity should be innate, inherent, and essential to matter, so that one body may act upon another at a distance through a vacuum . . . is to me so great an absurdity that I believe no man who has in philosophical matters a competent faculty of thinking can ever fall into it."56 But Newton will not compromise: "Newton's God is not merely a 'philosophical' God, the impersonal and uninterested First Cause of the Aristotelians, or the—for Newton—utterly indifferent and world-absent God of Descartes. He is . . . the Biblical God, the effective Master and Ruler of the world created by him."57 Even his " 'principles of mathematical philosophy' are . . . radically opposed to those of materialism . . . and postulate—or demonstrate—its [the world's] production by the purposeful action of a free and intelligent Being."58 "Newton explicitly recognized the challenge of the facts. . . . But he held that the explanation of this was a problem for religion, not mathematical philosophy," so he writes: "This most beautiful system of the sun, planets, and comets, could only proceed from the counsel and dominion of an intelligent and powerful Being."59 He seems to be quoting the Pearl of Great Price in such passages: "Does it not appear from Phaenomena that there is a Being incorporeal, living, intelligent, omnipresent, who in infinite Space, as it were in his Sensory, sees the things themselves intimately, and thoroughly perceives them, and comprehends them wholly by their immediate presence to himself."60
Newton thus becomes a highly unorthodox outcast of both camps: of the "spiritual" and abstract Mantic of his time, which did not derive faith from phenomena, and which still deplores the "cosmism" of the Latter-day Saints; and of the hard-headed scientists who insist that if you deal with phenomena it is not permitted to go any farther.61 "Men will say at last that all philosophy ought to be founded in atheism."62 "Mechanical hypotheses . . . lead straight away towards atheism, . . . deny God's action in the world and push him out of it. It is indeed, practically certain . . . that the true and ultimate cause of gravity is the action of the 'spirit' of God."63 Newton's own disciples would not tolerate his position; the very thing he took as proof of God, the force of attraction, they promptly converted into the opposite. But Newton prophesied they would by a deep and dangerous perversion of the very meaning and aim of natural philosophy "at last sink into the mire of that infamous herd who dream that all things are governed by fate [chance] and not by providence."64 Newton is not alone: it has been shown that the basic "prerequisite of genius" in science is on the one hand a refusal to "acquiesce" to the Sophic dogmas of the day, "imperviousness to the opinions of others, notably of authorities," and on the other hand of "a curious credulity" in Mantic matters.65
Descartes, with purely scientific interest in view, "entered into direct contact with the intellectual atmosphere of the Rosicrucians"66 and believed that his world-shaking discovery in mathematics was given to him in visions.67 Some present-day scientists also lean to the Mantic: "Yes, the triumphs of the physical scientists are impressive enough to explain why science has a great reputation. . . . But the mysteries of life—perhaps they are intended to remain mysteries."68 "The inductive format of the scientific paper should be discarded, . . . and scientists should not be ashamed, . . . as many of them apparently are ashamed to admit, that hypotheses . . . are imaginative and inspirational in character. . . . They are indeed adventures of the mind."69 This actually precedes the inductive format. "Hypotheses arise by guesswork. That is to put it in its crudest form. I should say rather that they arise by inspiration."70 "The most beautiful thing we can experience is the mysterious."71
Ancient Statements: Aristotle turned away from "the metaphysical and conceptual attitude of his early decades" to pure science; but in his old age he turned back again: "He justifies metaphysics now by means of the everlasting longing of the human heart."72 Aristotle's first work was a defense of the Mantic Homer against the Sophist critics.73 Both Plato and Aristotle in their old age turned with deepest devotion to the teachings of Zoroaster. Neither lost his scientific tendencies. Plato combined his Socratic with the Eleatic science and especially favored Pythagoras, in whom the Mantic and Sophic combine in a remarkable way.74 Plato and his predecessors "transform an originally theological idea, the idea of explaining the visible world by a postulated invisible world, into the fundamental instrument of theoretical science."75 "By his adoption of geometry as the theory of the world he provided Aristarchus, Newton, and Einstein with their intellectual toolbox."76 Thus the Mantic Plato made solid scientific contributions. He insisted that knowledge came by inspiration, via anamnesis, as did Pythagoras: "I do not teach myself anything, I only remember."77 Popper explains this midway position between Mantic and Sophic as the "second-order tradition" which welcomed the heritage of myth as the foundation for new and fruitful discussion and investigation, instead of condemning it.78 The Poet is exalted up to the point where he becomes another Pythian, whose ravings are unintelligible to himself. "He is relegated to an adyton, and between him and the public the Philosopher keeps guard, who alone can understand and interpret him,"79 according to a recent interpretation which places philosophy squarely between the Mantic and the public.
The original line of inspiration is lost in the mists of time, and may, as among the Ancient Semites, have gone back "to the shacir, the Knower, the possessor of supernatural knowledge. He passed as a kind of oracle for his tribe, as did the kahin. . . . His capacity was attributed to a special spirit (jinn, or in Greek, daimon)."80 Plato, like Newton, insisted that the ultimate mover was a divine spirit, Aristotle an entelecheia; Pythagoras and Philoslaeus harmonia, and Xenocrates number.81 These thinkers seem to combine Sophic and Mantic, yet any concession whatever to the Mantic disqualifies them in this Sophic camp. Cato, who "rejected the findings of Greek philosophy in order to fall back upon a shrewd peasant wisdom,"82 combines a much lower order of Sophic and Mantic. Sextus Empiricus is another who turns against the Sophic, but in a "puerile and pedantic" way, attacking its good (especially its good) as well as its bad side.83 While the students at Socrates' school went deeply into experimental science, to the amusement of the more practically minded Athenians, "they were [at the same time] much occupied with religion and the after life." So they offended both the learned Sophist and the superstitious man in the street.84 "It is your neglect of geometry," Socrates tells the businessman Callicles, "which convinces you that you should strive for a bigger share of things than other men possess";85 for business rejects both the egghead Sophic and the impractical Mantic.
"When I was young," says Socrates, "I was fanatically devoted to the intellectual quest which they call physical research. . . . I was convinced that no one need look any farther than science for the answers to everything."86 Plato confesses the same weakness and goes on to relate how he was converted, not away from the study of physical science, but to seeing in physical science, as Newton did, the workings of a divine and directing mind.87 At the end of the Sophist, Plato defines a Sophist as one who treats all traditions and beliefs as strictly human productions. For him this will not do; there was more behind it than that. The great men of old—poets, diviners, statesmen, and prophets—prove their inspiration "when they say much that is true without knowing what they say."88 "Poetry is really a thing divine and holy. . . . Its votaries (as Plato would say) are in a state of fine phrenzy."89 "I know that they do what they do not by any intelligence of their own, but by a special nature, an inspiration such as holy prophets and oracles have, for they too speak many fine and wonderful things without knowing what they are saying."90 The only fit instruction for the youth are the words of men "inspired from heaven."91
Socrates explains his course of life against the Sophists: "Because, as I said, the way was shown to me by God, by oracles and dreams and by whatever other means divine providence directs the actions of men."92 "Listen to a tale which you consider a myth," he says to a gathering of Sophist teachers, "but which I believe to be true. . . . In a word, whatever characteristics a man's body presented in life, these remain visible in death. . . . But you, . . . the wisest of all the Greeks of our day, can't demonstrate the necessity of living any other life than this one."93 It is a direct confrontation of Sophic and Mantic, and in the end cost Socrates his life. In the same spirit, modern professors, offended by the Mantic emphasis of Plato's Ion, deny its authenticity. It must not be forgotten that the University never forgot that it was a Musaeon, a temple of the Muses, who gave divine inspiration to men.
1. Jacob Bronowski, "The Logic of the Mind," American Scientist 54 (March 1966): 4; cf. Julian Jaynes, "The Routes of Science," American Scientist 54 (March 1966): 95.
2. Luís A. Sánchez, quoted in Carleton Beals, Nomads and Empire Builders (New York: Chilton, 1961), 64.
3. Detlev W. Bronk, quoted in Vance Packard, The Waste Makers (New York: David McKay, 1960), 318.
4. Werner Jaeger, Aristotle, tr. Richard Robinson (Oxford: Clarendon, 1948), 335.
5. Sigmund Freud, The Future of an Illusion, tr. and ed. James Strachey (New York: Norton, 1961), 56. This concluding sentence was once required reading for all freshman at the University of California.
6. Karl Pearson, "The Knowledge of the Natural World," Part B, in Troy W. Organ, The Examined Life (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1956): 120.
7. Sir Gavin de Beer, "Natural Selection after 100 Years," The Listener (3 July 1958): 12 (emphasis added). Cf. John Wild, "The Exploration of the Life-World," Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 34 (October 1961): 18, on science as the only truth.
8. Jaeger, Aristotle, 373-74 (emphasis added).
9. Dio Chrysostom, Discourse XII, 57-58.
10. Jaeger, Aristotle, 376.
11. Arthur W. Munk, "Philosophy, Science and Man's Plight," Pacific Philosophy Forum 6 (September 1967): 13-16.
12. Richard McKenna, "The Secret Place," in The Nebula Award Stories: Number Two (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1967), 15.
13. Nicolas Berdyaev, Solitude and Society (London: Centenary, 1938), 12.
14. Pearson, "The Knowledge of the Natural World," 120. Cf. Francis Bacon, Novum Organum I, 54.
15. Rudolf Jordan, The New Perspective (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), 171.
16. Marvin Minsky, "Machines Are More Than They Seem," Science Journal 4 (October 1968): 3.
17. Pearson, "The Knowledge of the Natural World," 119.
18. Midrash Genesis Rabbah (Noach) 38:6.
19. Hugh Nibley, "How to Have a Quiet Campus, Antique Style," BYU Studies 9 (Summer 1969): 448-50; reprinted in this volume, pages 297-99.
20. Leslie A. White, "Evolutionism in Cultural Anthropology: A Rejoinder," The American Anthropologist 49 (July-September 1947): 402.
21. John C. Greene, "Darwin and Religion," Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 103 (1959): 717.
22. Sir Ronald Fisher, "The Discontinuous Inheritance," The Listener (17th July 1958): 85.
23. Dorsey Hager, "Fifty Years of Progress in Geology: The Presidential Address to the Utah Geological Society," Geotimes 2 (August 1957): 12.
24. Hermann J. Muller, "One Hundred Years without Darwinism Are Enough," The Humanist 19 (June 1959): 139-40.
25. Ernest Jones, "Nature of Genius," Scientific Monthly 84 (February 1957): 81.
26. J. B. Bury and Russell Meiggs, A History of Greece to the Death of Alexander the Great, 4th ed. (New York: St. Martin's, 1975): 199.
27. Erwin Rohde, Psyche: The Cult of Souls and Belief in Immortality among the Greeks, tr. W. B. Hillis, 2 vols. (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1966), 2:290.
28. Theodor Hopfner, Orient und griechische Philosophie (Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1925), 64-65.
29. Dio Chrysostom, Discourse XII, 57.
30. Albert Guérard, Fossils and Presences (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1957), 266.
31. N. S. Sutherland, "Machines Like Men," Science Journal 4 (October 1968): 47.
32. Karl R. Popper, "Science: Problems, Aims, Responsibilities," Federation Proceedings of the American Societies for Experimental Biology 22 (1963): 962 (emphasis added).
33. Ibid., 963-64.
34. Ibid., 964, 970.
35. Karl R. Popper, quoted in Warren Weaver, "The Imperfections of Science," American Scientist 49 (March 1961): 112.
36. Eduard Meyer, "Die Bedeutung der Erschliessung des alten Orients für die geschichtliche Methode und für die Anfänge der menschlichen Geschichte Überhaupt," Sitzungsberichte der berlinischen Akademie 25 (1908): 648-52.
37. Charles Darwin, quoted in Max Rosenberg, Introduction to Philosophy (New York: Philosophical Library, 1955), 286.
38. Heinrich Schirmbeck, "Evolution und Freiheit," Merkur 14 (June 1960): 523.
39. J. T. Merz, Religion and Science, A Philosophical Essay (Edinburgh: Blackwood and Sons, 1915); 103, quoted in A. P. Elkin, "A Darwin Centenary and Highlights of Field-Work in Australia," Mankind 5 (November 1959): 333.
40. Nikolai Kozyrev, "An Unexplored World," Soviet Life (November 1965): 45, in which the foremost Russian astrophysicist rejects the finality of entropy.
41. "Man Superior to Machine," Science Newsletter 71 (12 January 1957): 22.
42. Richard Courant and Herbert Robbins, What Is Mathematics? (New York: Oxford University Press, 1941): xvii-xviii.
43. Pierre L. du Noüy, Human Destiny (New York: Longmans, Green, 1947), 3.
44. Berdyaev, Solitude and Society, 15-17.
45. R. Buckminster Fuller, Intuition (Garden City, NY: Double-day, 1972), 39.
46. Ibid., 41, 42, 46, 70.
47. Plato, Gorgias 527B; and Pindar, Olympian Odes II, 91-97, are two examples.
48. George Saintsbury, A History of Criticism and Literary Taste in Europe, 3 vols. (London: William Blackwood and Sons, 1949), 1:22.
49. Gilbert Murray, Aristophanes (London: Oxford University Press, 1933), 20; Saintsbury, A History of Criticism, 1:22-23.
50. Wilhelm Nestle, Vom Mythos zum Logos (Stuttgart: Scientia Verlag Aalen, 1966), 539.
51. Jaeger, Aristotle, 402.
52. Karl R. Popper, Conjectures and Refutations (New York: Basic Books, 1962), 51.
53. Ibid., 12-15, 49-51.
54. Herwig Maehler, "Review of E. N. Tigerstedt's Plato's Ideas of Poetical Inspiration," Gnomon 44 (November 1972): 645.
55. Jones, "Nature of Genius," 81.
56. Isaac Newton, quoted in Alexandre Koyré, From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Press, 1957), 178-79.
57. Ibid., 225.
58. Ibid., 241.
59. Lancelot L. Whyte, Accent on Form (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1954), 71-72.
60. Newton, quoted in Koyré, From the Closed World, 208-9 (emphasis added).
61. Edwin A. Burtt, The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Physical Science (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1950), 282-84.
62. George Berkeley, quoted in Koyré, From the Closed World, 233.
63. Newton's conclusion of his General Scholium; Koyré, From the Closed World, 234.
64. Koyré, From the Closed World, 232.
65. Jones, "Nature of Genius," 80.
66. Jacques Maritain, The Dream of Descartes, tr. Mabelle L. Andison (New York: Philosophical Library, 1944): 18.
67. Ibid., 19-23. Cf. Carl Sagan, The Cosmic Connection (New York: Doubleday, 1973), 103-4, and I. Bernard Cohen, Revolution in Science (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), 131-32.
68. Weaver, "The Imperfections," 100.
69. P. B. Medawar, "Is the Scientific Paper Fraudulent?" Journal of Human Relations 13 (1965): 6.
70. Ibid., 5.
71. Albert Einstein, quoted in James T. Adams et al., Living Philosophies (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1931), 6.
72. Jaeger, Aristotle, 337, 339.
73. Wilhelm Schmid, Geschichte der griechischen Literatur (Munich: Beck, 1940), 1:1:131; Aristotle, Poetics 25.
74. Nestle, Vom Mythos zum Logos, 540-42.
75. Popper, Conjectures and Refutations, 89.
76. Ibid., 92.
77. Lucian, Bion Prasis (Philosopher's Auction) 3.
78. Popper, Conjectures and Refutations, 126-27.
79. E. N. Tigerstedt, quoted in Maehler, "Review of E. N. Tigerstedt," 645 (emphasis added).
80. Carl Brockelmann, Geschichte der arabischen Literatur (Leipzig: Amelang, 1901), 1:12.
81. Macrobius, Saturnalia I, 14, 19.
82. Charles N. Cochrane, Christianity and Classical Culture (New York: Oxford University Press, 1944), 32.
83. John E. Sandys, A History of Classical Scholarship, 3 vols. (New York:Hafner, 1958), 1:330.
84. Murray, Aristophanes, 93.
85. Plato, Gorgias 508.
86. Plato, Phaedo 96A.
87. Ibid., 97C.
88. Plato, Meno 99D.
89. Psellus, cited in Sandys, A History of Classical Scholarship, 1:389.
90. Plato, Apology 22C.
91. Plato, Laws VII, 809B-11E; Plato, Republic III, 394A-395E.
92. Plato, Apology 33C.
93. Plato, Gorgias 524, 527.